Elisha L. Spalding, 11th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, Company
K
Our Spalding lineage:
Edward Spalding - Benjamin - Edward - Ephraim - Ezekiel - Miner
- Ephraim - Daniel - Jesse
Daniel's brother was Elisha L. Spalding who served for three
years in the 11th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, Company K. The Eleventh Regiment of
Kansas volunteers was raised in response to the call of the President of July,
1862, following the reverses of McClellan before Richmond for 300,000 volunteers
for "three years or during the war." Kansas was sparsely populated at this time
and had already furnished ten regiments to the Union army. The Eleventh Regiment
of Kansas Volunteers consisted mostly of men with families who had recently
emigrated to the State. The full quota was not only raised in an unprecedented
short period of time, but the stimulus given to recruiting furnished hundreds of
recruits for the older regiments as well. On August 8th, 1862, Company A was
mustered in and by the 14th of September, the last company, Company K, had been
mustered in. Elisha enlisted Sept. 2, 1862 and became a private with Company K,
under the command of Captain John M. Allen.
On the 4th of October, twenty days after its organization, the
11th regiment, with eager steps, started on its first campaign. The march to
Fort Scott, one hundred and twenty-five miles, was made in five days, where the
regiment lay until the afternoon of the 15th, waiting for supplies and
ammunition. The regiment proceeded to Pea Ridge, Arkansas, arriving on the 19th.
The march had been forced, and one that tried the men more than any subsequent
one they ever made; but there was no rest in store for them now. The night of
the 20th, they marched to Bentonville, and the next night to the vicinity of Old
Fort Wayne, C.N., where Confederate forces lay with a force of three thousand
men, preparing for a raid on Forth Scott. The 11th in their eagerness to be on
hand, threw away overcoats and everything that impeded their movements, but
arrived on the field only in time to see the enemy's rear disappear, pursued by
the cavalry. The Union army had attacked at daylight with their cavalry advance,
and so complete was the surprise that a handful of cavalry routed the whole
Confederate force.
The Battle of Prairie Grove
From Fort Wayne the Division moved to Little Osage, six miles
south of Bentonville, Arkansas. On the 14th of November the Division moved
southward to Flint Creek, near the western line of Arkansas, where it lay for a
couple of weeks, almost without rations waiting for the arrival of supplies from
Fort Scott. The supplies arrived on the 27th and early the next morning the
whole force moved, without transportation, for Cane Hill, forty miles south,
where the rebel General Marmaduke lay with a force of 6,000 cavalry and a
battery of artillery. The march was accomplished and the attack made at 11
o'clock the next day, the 11th leading the infantry advance. After a short
resistance, the enemy retreated from the town, but made a desperate stand on the
east of the Boston Mountains, four miles to the south, from which they were duly
driven after stubborn fighting, which continued for six miles through the
forests and ravines of the mountains to the Junction of Fayetteville and Cane
Hill roads, where the action was closed by nightfall by a brilliant charge of
the 6th Kansas cavalry, leaving the enemy in full retreat for the Arkansas
river. The 11th deserved and received the econiums of the commanding General for
its veteran-like behavior in the action. The army returned to Cane Hill next
morning and went into camp while the transportation was brought up from Flint
Creek.
The Division had hardly gotten comfortable at Cane Hill before
word was brought that the rebels were planning another offensive movement to
take back the mountain. The joint forces of the enemy were over twenty-five
thousand, of which all but five thousand were infantry, newly armed with Enfield
rifles. On Saturday evening the 6th of December a desperate struggle took place
for possession of the summit of the mountain which the rebels had surrendered so
unwillingly at the battle of Cane Hill. The overwhelming numbers of the rebels
finally prevailed, and darkness put an end to the contest. While the 11th lost
largely in its brave but vain endeavor to hold ground against greatly superior
numbers, the loss of the enemy was afterwards ascertained to have been more than
four times greater.
At 10 o'clock on Sunday morning, the 11th began falling back
from Cane Hill to join with other regiments to reinforce a Regiment which, with
a force with a force of scarcely five thousand men, had been contending with
varying successes against a force outnumbering them three to one, and constantly
increasing. The last five miles of the march was made at the music of the raging
battle and at the double-quick, the regiments vying with each other for the
honor of being the first to get into the fight. The 11th had the infantry
advance when the line of battle was formed. The enemy's skirmishers were
speedily driven back over the rise, and the whole line advanced about halfway up
the ascent, where they were ordered to fix their bayonets for a charge as soon
as the crest should be reached. The rebels who had been concealed in the thick
woods beyond, charged over the brow of the hill, massed four ranks deep. They
were received with a volley that checked their advance temporarily. A terrible
struggle ensued. The weight of numbers was with the rebels, three to one. The
Union line was gradually forced back to a line of fence skirting the woods where
the last desperate stand was made just before night fall, and the position held
by a few resolute men, until the rebels gave up the contest and fell back under
cover of darkness. Several times the rebels essayed the capture of our batteries
in the open field but were as often driven back with terrible slaughter. The
rebels order for battle directed that their cavalry be posted in the rear of
their infantry with instructions to shoot all stragglers, and so all day the
surging mass of rebel infantry was crowded forwarded with desperate vehemence
and recklessness, with certain death behind if they quailed.
The 11th came off the battlefield with ranks thinned but
unbroken, having fired the last shot of the contest, under orders to form a new
line of battle in the rear of the position where the last victorious stand was
made, and where the broken and scattered fragments of the Division had been
gathered. The action was not regarded as decisive, and all night preparations
were going on for the encounter that was expected on the morrow. Provisions and
ammunition were brought up and distributed and every preparation was made for a
more desperate contest that that which had just closed. About daylight, the
revels, under cover of a flag of truce, asked for an interview, delaying the
operations of the Union army, which was to have attacked at that hour. The
interview was soon discovered to be a mere ruse to gain time, the rebels having
evacuated their position seemingly early in the night and now being miles away.
The Union loss in killed and wounded was about 1,200, of which
the 11th had its full share, and from among the best and bravest in its ranks.
That of the rebels was about two thousand, five hundred, of which all the dead
and two thirds of the wounded fell into Union hands. The battle was named
Prairie Grove. It was one of the bloodiest and by far the most decisive of the
battles fought in Arkansas during the war, and was equivalent to a rout in its
effect on the enemy's army, as not less than three thousand of their men
deserted after the battle and never after, during the war, did the rebels have
an army of all arms north of the Arkansas River.
A couple of days after the battle, the regiment, returned to
its old camping ground at Cane Hill, where it remained until December 27th, when
it went with the army to Van Burin, on the Arkansas River, fifty miles south, in
search of the rebels. No transportation was taken and each man carried six days
cooked rations and his blankets. The first twenty miles of the march was through
a gorge of the Boston Mountains, known as the Cove Creek road. This road was
crossed and recrossed over forty times by a swift mountain stream though which
the men had to wade, heavily laden, and they were often swept from their feet,
losing rations and blankets. Many died from the effects of this exposure and the
remembrance of it remained in the bones of many more.
The Confederate army prudently put the Arkansas River between
them and danger, leaving only a regiment of cavalry on the north side, which was
surprised and annihilated. On the 31st the army started on its return.
Transportation was joined at Rhea's Mills, and the army marched to Elm Springs,
twelve miles northwest of Fayetteville, where it lay about two weeks. They were
ordered to return to Springfield, Missouri to remain until spring. The first
halt was made at Cane Creek, thirty miles south of Springfield. Here the measles
broke out in camp with great violence, causing many deaths. Sickness of all
kinds was very prevalent. The locality came to be spoken of in the regiment as
the "Valley of the Shadow of Death." In the middle of February a move was made
to a point fifty miles west of Springfield, in Lawrence County, commonly known
as Camp Solomon.
On the 17th the troops of the division were ordered to march to
the vicinity of Fort Scott for the purpose of being furloughed. On the 27th the
major portion were sent to the localities where recruited with orders to report
back at the expiration of thirty days.
From Infantry to Cavalry
At the expiration of this leave, the regiment marched from Fort
Scott to Salem, Missouri and joined the remainder of the Army of the Frontier.
From here the 11th was sent to the District of the Border, headquarters at
Kansas City, including Southwestern Missouri and most of Kansas, arriving at
Kansas City about the 20th of April. The regiment had now been in service about
nine months and its ranks were sadly thinned, having lost over three hundred men
and being reduced below the minimum number. At Kansas City the regiment was
changed from infantry to cavalry, intended as a reward for service theretofore
rendered, the change being earnestly desired by nearly the entire regiment.
The regiment began doing the arduous, dangerous, and thankless
duties of the Border service: Escorting trains, policing the country, hunting
bushwhackers. This service called for rare watchfulness, constant exposure,
self-reliance, and personal daring, with no reward save the consciousness of
duty faithfully done.
In the latter part of September the rebels made a cavalry raid
into central Missouri, most of the 11th were sent in the successful pursuit and
expulsion of the rebels from the District. During the winter and early spring
[1863-1864] Co. L of the 11th was mustered. The regiment, now over twelve
hundred strong, was all stationed at Kansas.
The Price Raid
In late summer of 1864, less than a year before the war's end,
Confederate General Sterling Price led a march across the state of Missouri in
one last attempt to gain support and supplies for the Confederacy. Price
originally planned to threaten St. Louis, but a battle at Pilot Knob in
southeastern Missouri gave the North time to reinforce the city's defenses.
Price headed west to Jefferson City, then on to Kansas City, and eventually
threatened Kansas itself.
At Lexington, Missouri on October 19, 1864, Union forces caught
up with Price and began a series of battles that ended six days later in Linn
County along Mine Creek. The Eleventh took part in the Price Raid battles around
Kansas City and the pursuit of Price south toward Mine Creek.
On September 19, 1864, General Sterling
Price led a Confederate army of about twelve thousand men across the southern
border of Missouri. He hoped to capture that state for the South. His orders
were to "Rally the loyal men of Missouri" and fill his ranks with fresh
recruits. If "compelled to withdraw from the State," Price was to make his
"retreat through Kansas . . . sweeping that country of its mules, horses,
cattle, and military supplies of all kinds."
Price's three divisions moved toward St. Louis. On September 27
they defeated a much smaller federal force at Pilot Knob. Confederate losses
were heavy, however, and St. Louis had been reinforced. Thus, Price chose to
turn west, making no attempt to capture that city. He proceeded along the
southern bank of the Missouri River, destroying sections of the railroad, and
capturing several small towns as he moved toward the Kansas border.
As word of Price's movements spread, Kansans prepared for an
invasion. Governor Thomas Carney called out the state militia on October 8.
General Samuel R. Curtis combined the forces at his disposal to form the Army of
the Border. The fighting began for Kansas troops with a skirmish at Lexington,
Missouri, on October 19. Confederates won several victories in the Kansas City
area, including the Battle of the Big Blue on October 22. But the invading force
was repulsed at Westport on October 23 and forced to retreat down the state
line. The following day General Curtis released most of the Kansas militia and
reformed his army. General James G. Blunt commanded the First Division, and
General Alfred Pleasonton commanded the Second Division. The total strength of
this pursuing Union army was about ten thousand men--all cavalry.
Crossing into Kansas in Linn County on October 24, Price's army
camped near Trading Post. Before dawn on October 25, it was overtaken by the
pursing federal force. A running battle commenced, lasting the entire day. The
decisive engagement came late in the morning. General John Marmaduke, one of the
Confederate division commanders, was forced to fight a rear guard action on the
north bank of Mine Creek to protect Price's fleeing wagon train. He was
supported by General James Fagan's division, which had already crossed the
creek. The two Confederate divisions contained about seven thousand men.
Although the Union advance under Pleasonton numbered less than twenty-five
hundred, the rebels were crushed by a furious cavalry charge.
Colonel Charles W. Blair, 14th Kansas Cavalry, explained: "For
a time [during the initial clash] the fire was incessant and terrific. Both
lines seemed like walls of adamant--one could not advance; the other would not
recede." Colonel F. W. Benteen was commander of the brigade that first made
contact with the enemy. He described a "fierce hand-to-hand fight, one that
surpassed anything for the time it lasted [that] I have ever witnessed." In less
than an hour, the battle was over. Confederate soldiers were bolting to the
rear, "in utter and indescribable confusion," according to General Price. His
army narrowly missed total destruction.
Continuing his retreat, Price was forced to abandon plans to
attack Fort Scott. His troops purposely destroyed most of the wagon train
carrying their supplies and booty. After a short rest, Generals Curtis and Blunt
followed in pursuit. On October 28 they handed Price his final defeat at
Newtonia, Missouri. The rebel army recrossed the Arkansas River on November 8.
For all practical purposes, the Civil War in the West was over.
In all the marches and battles of this eventful campaign, the
11th bore prominent and honorable part. It had the advance of General Blunt's
forces in the dash on Lexington. Cos. A, B and F occupied advanced positions on
the line of rebel approach to the city, and held them until surrounded and then
fought their way out and rejoined the command after they had been given up as
entirely lost. The regiment alone covered the perilous retreat of the army from
Lexington on the 19th of October, in a series of desperate contests with
overwhelming numbers in a manner to fully accomplish the object aimed at and to
win the special commendation of the commander-in-chief. Being left alone to
guard the crossings of the Little Blue, while the main force fell back to
Independence, two days after the fight at Lexington, it had the honor of opening
the battle to which that stream gives its name, and which, though temporarily a
victory for Price, was so dearly bought in the losses from his ranks as well as
the delay occasioned him, as to be really a bad defeat. The infantry experience
of the regiment proved of great service in this battle, as the men were
dismounted and fought on foot nearly the entire day. Cos. B and I charged over a
stone well, behind which a superior force of the rebels had entrenched
themselves, killing and capturing nearly the whole lot. Co. M, now under fire
for the second time, bore itself worthy the old time reputation of the regiment,
standing at the head in the number of its killed and wounded, among the latter
its captain. Co. E had in charge a battery of four howitzers which were served
in a gallant manner and with great effect. Co. H held an important ford, singly
and alone, until late in the day, saving much to our right flank, which it thus
covered. Co. A made a brilliant charge, unmounted, down a narrow lane early in
the action, clearing it of rebels and helping Co. F to obtain an advanced
position, which it reached under a galling fire. Cos. C, D and K held the center
and were last off the field.
Finally, when the retreat was ordered, the regiment was again
assigned the duty of covering the rear, which it did with its usual fidelity and
success, enabling the army to place itself in a place of safety behind the line
of the Big Blue.
The Battle of Big
Blue
The next day the regiment participated in the battle of Big
Blue, including the cavalry charge which drove the rebels over the Kansas line,
one battalion breaking into fragments and putting to rout Jackman's whole
brigade of rebels. The next day (Sunday) in the beginning of the battle of
Westport, the regiment achieved a brilliant success, which it was prevented from
following up by an order from General Curtis to fall back. The day, however, was
one of victory, and the rebel retreat southward down the state line began.
Colonel Moonlight was then sent to hover on their flank and prevent their
entering Kansas. The rebels encountered at Cold Water Grove, at Mound City, and
at Fort Lincoln, and his marauders kept from their work of devastation in the
state they so bitterly hated.
In the pursuit which followed from Fort Scott the 11th
participated to the last, and after the rebels had been driven across the
Arkansas River, instead of remaining with the remainder of the troops to their
stations were sent to Fort Smith, from whence they returned to Kansas, arriving
at Paola December 12th, just two months after beginning the campaign.
The hardships of the latter part of the campaign were its chief
features. The men were thinly clad, and the weather became very cold and stormy.
The regiment had no transportation, and so insufficient were the provisions for
subsistence that for two entire days the men had nothing but coffee and bacon
and the three following nothing but coffee, and that in scant supply. The
country furnished no forage and the horses were constantly giving out, so that
by the time the regiment arrived at Paola, the loss was over two thirds of the
whole number, and not one was fit to be ridden. For four hundred miles the
regiment repeated the experience of its early infantry services.
The regiment was ordered to Fort Riley to outfit and recruit,
preparatory to service on the Plains against the Indians. Early in February Cos.
C and E were ordered to Fort Larned. It was then the intention that the whole
regiment should soon follow, to make a campaign against the Indians on the Smoky
Hill. But a change of Department commanders brought a change of plan and on the
20th of February the remaining nine companies started for Fort Kearney. Nearly
one-third of the regiment were still dismounted, and fully one half not properly
clothed, owing to the lack of supplies at Fort Riley.
Fort Kearney is distant, two hundred miles from Riley, and the
march was accomplished in twelve days, the command arriving on the 4th of March.
No previous experience of cold and exposure equaled that of the regiment on this
march, which, severe as it was, proved only a slight foretaste of what was still
before them. Violent storms of either snow or rain prevailed constantly. Large
numbers of the men were on foot and the greater share were insufficiently
clothed. Many were badly frozen, and it sometimes happened that the footmen
because lost from the command during the severe snow storms that obscured the
heavens and drifted the roads, and were only found and saved from freezing to
death by details sent out from camp as soon as their absence was known. The
great severity of the weather may be better understood when it is stated that a
regiment of cavalry ordered from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Kearney at the same
time the 11th was ordered from Fort Riley, found it impossible to march after
the first two or three days out and lay by over a month in Northern Kansas and
Southern Nebraska in fact, until the 11th arrived at the foot of the mountains,
Five Hundred Miles beyond Fort Kearney before its commander considered it safe
to venture to resume his march.
Recent high waters had swept away the bridges which the
government had, a few years previously, built over most of the intervening
streams. As the waters were still high, these bridges were nearly all to be
rebuilt, which, however, in the hands of the competent and willing men always to
be found in the ranks of the 11th, was comparatively a small job.
At Fort Kearney only a two days' halt was allowed one for
shoeing horses and drawing supplies, and one for inspection. Notwithstanding the
unfavorable circumstances, the regiment appeared to good advantage and was
highly complimented by both the inspecting officer and Gen. Mitchell.
Fort Laramie, four hundred miles northwest of Fort Kearney, was
the objective point from whence an early spring campaign was to be prosecuted
against the Sioux Indians on the Powder River, two hundred and fifty miles still
further to the northwest. The weather continued very severe, and the exposure
and hardships of the march were aggravated by the lack of firewood, there being
but two points on the route from Kearney to Laramie where supplies could be had.
The main reliance was upon the willows, no larger than a man's thumb, that grew
on the islands of the Platte River, and even these could not always be had. At
the Sioux agency, thirty miles below Laramie, the regiment was stopped by an
order from Gen. Connor who had relieved Gen. Mitchell in command of the
District, to halt and await further orders.
The men, with that readiness of resource that always
distinguishes old campaigners, set about making themselves comfortable. The
tough alkali sod of the Platte bottom was formed into houses and stables with
marvelous rapidity, and in two days time a city sprang up which, if without
architectural pretensions, was yet laid out with wide streets and commendable
regularity, and answered the purpose of comfort. About the time this work was
fairly complete orders were received to proceed to Fort Laramie and report for
duty to Colonel Baumer, 1st Nebraska, commanding Post.
The regiment arrived at Fort Laramie April 9th, and there
received news of the first successes around Petersburg via Overland Telegraph
which caused great rejoicing. No halt was made, orders being to proceed at once
to Platte Bridge, one hundred and thirty miles west, and from that point as
headquarters, making such disposition of the companies as would best serve to
protect the telegraph, obtain information on the Indians, and prevent their
crossing the Platte and going south.
Although spring was well now advanced, there were no tokens of
it in the air or landscape. The Laramie Mountains to the left were covered with
snow, to which more was being added by storms every few days.
At Deer Creek, thirty miles from Platte Bridge, Major Adams was
left with Companies D and L. Co. I, Captain Greer, was sent to Sweet Water
station, fifty miles west, and shortly after Co. H, Lt. Bodwell, was added.
Regimental headquarters were established about six miles from Platte Bridge,
near the mountains, on account of its convenience.
But twenty days' rations of corn could be drawn at Laramie and
this, we soon found, was to be the total supply for the summer. The grass had
not yet started even that of the previous year's growth, scant, and also dried
and almost worthless was often covered with snow. The horses soon became weak
and unserviceable and many of them died. There was shameful lack in every
department, not only for the necessaries of a campaign, but for troops in camp
or garrison. Neither quartermaster, commissary or Ordnance supplies could be had
in anything like needed quantities for even a single regiment and of ammunition
suitable for the carbines carried by the 11th, not a cartridge was to be had
short of Fort Leavenworth, one thousand miles distant.
The telegraph route from Laramie to South Pass, nearly three
hundred miles, was garrisoned by three companies of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, in
detachments of from ten to fifty, according to the exposed condition of the
place, and from thirty to fifty miles distant from each other. The men had been
almost wholly dismounted, as the effect of the various raids of Indians upon the
route.
A few days after the arrival of the regiment at Platte Bridge, a
dispatch was received from Capt. Marshall, commanding at La Bouter, half way
between Laramie and Platte Bridge, stating that the Indians had just stampeded
the remainder of his horses from under the very eyes of the garrison, and asking
that a force be sent in pursuit. Maj. Adams was accordingly dispatched from Deer
Creek with detachments of Cos. D and I, in all about thirty men, to endeavor to
intercept the Indians in their northward flight with the stock. Night overtook
the Major in a range of barren sand hills, far distant from timber or water. The
horses were picketed to sage bushes or held by their lariats by the men, whom
the Major, in what was thought an excess of caution, required to lie down in
line upon their arms, and under minute instructions as to their duties in case
of a night attack. Pickets were placed on each side of the camping place, about
six rods distant. The camp was in a hollow, and so surrounded by ravines that
there was but one approach to it over level ground, and that so narrow and
winding that one not familiar with the exact lay of the land, could not find it
in the night. About nine o'clock and when all but the sentinels were fast
asleep, the sound of approaching horsemen were heard. Soon the pickets saw
against the horizon from their lower station a swiftly moving mass coming over
the level approach, straight for camp. When within a few rods they fired, and
the Indians, disconcerted, turned, and instead of dashing through the camp, as
was their evident intention, dashed along its front, shooting into it with fire
arms but receiving a hot welcome from the now aroused men. The whole affair did
not last over three minutes from the time when the Indians were first seen to
that when they disappeared in the darkness. In the morning eight Indian horses
were found, most of them with bloody trappings, but not an Indian, nor did the
Major succeed in again getting sight of one on this scout. This affair was worth
much to the men, who, mainly ignorant by experience of the Indian character,
could hardly be brought to consider the savages as foemen worthy of their steel,
or of any consideration whatever. Sentinels, herders and scouting parties were
always thereafter on the qui vive, and to the watchfulness thus engendered, may
be largely attributed the fact that during over four months operations among the
Indians, there were but nine horses taken from the regiment by the favorite
Indian method of stampeding, and they by a superior force at a remote stage
station.
From this time forward the Indians fairly swarmed along the
telegraph line. Scouting and hunting parties encountered them and videttes and
herders of the stock were kept constantly on the alert. Skirmishes were frequent
and several most sanguinary encounters took place. Generally the advantage was
with "the boys," and never were they driven from the field. The telegraph line
was kept up and in working order, notwithstanding the efforts of the Indians to
interrupt its operations by cutting the wires and capture and destroy the
station.
The muster out of the 11th commenced in June, and about twenty
men of Co. G stationed at Fort Leavenworth were discharged when the further
muster out was stopped by orders from the War Department. Maj. Anderson
commanded the companies of the 11th remaining on the telegraph line, with
headquarters at Platte Bridge. Co. I was stationed at the same place, and for
several days previous to July 21st had been camped in the Platte bottom, near
the telegraph stations, which was composed of several log buildings, forming
three sides of a square, and a stockade, covering stabling for about 50 horses,
forming the other. The evening of the 21st, the Indians made their appearance in
considerable force near the station and stampeded some cattle. A portion of Co.
I under Captain Greer pursued, and a fight ensued, in which the Indians were
whipped, and left their dead on the field. At the same time the telegraph wires
were cut both sides of the station. Lt. G. M. Walker, Acting Adjutant, was sent
out with a party to endeavor to repair the line in the direction of Fort Laramie
so that communication could be had with Deer Creek station, thirty miles
distant, where Co. K was stationed; but before he arrived at the break, he was
attacked by an overwhelming force of Indians and compelled to retreat to the
station, with the loss of one man killed and several wounded. Private Baker, Co.
K, in this encounter, was thrust nearly through the body with a bayonet used as
a lance by an Indian, the bayonet remaining in the wound. A comrade pulled it
out with great effort and Baker lived to tell the tale and carry his wounded
body behind a plow in the Cottonwood Valley. The garrison at the Bridge
consisted of about seventy men of Co. I of the 11th, twenty men of the 11th
Ohio, under Lts. Bretner and Collins, and the noncommissioned staff and band of
the 11th [Kansas] in all about 110 men. Of these about 80 were armed with
carbines and of the remainder about one-half had no arms and others only
revolvers. Owing to the criminal negligence either of the Department commander
or of the Ordnance Department, ammunition suitable for the carbines had never
been within reach since the 11th had left Fort Riley and so now the little
garrison at Platte Bridge was provided with less than 20 rounds of cartridges
per man. About midnight, a small party of the 11th Ohio came in from Sweet Water
station, fifty miles west, having seen no Indians. They reported having passed a
party of the 11th in camp at Willow Springs, half way to Sweet Water. This was a
train escort of 24 men of Cos. D and H, under command of Sergeant Custard of the
latter company, who had been up as far as South Pass with supplies for the
various stations and were now returning.
Next morning at daylight the Indians showed themselves on the
vary hills around the station, but not in considerable numbers, yet sufficient,
taken in connection with the possibilities of a larger force concealed, to
induce great caution on the part of the commander of the station. Anxious watch
was kept westward for a sight of Sergeant Custard's party. About 10 o'clock it
came in view, on a high hill about six miles distant, and the howitzer was fired
to warn them of danger, of which it seemed apparent that they had as yet no
conception. The Indians seemed to discover the party at the same time with the
garrison and immediately turned their attention that way. At this, Maj. Anderson
ordered Lt. Collins, with about 30 of the best mounted and armed men of the
11th, to go to the assistance of the coming detachment. Lt. Collins crossed the
bridge, moved out rapidly through the bottom and to the first range of bluffs on
the road, probably half a mile from the station, the Indians giving way before
him and making no demonstrations. Suddenly from the ravines, from the timber of
the Platte, and from behind every knoll there sprang into full view 2,000
Indians, who had thus lain in wait for a demonstration from the garrison, and
charged as if with one impulse upon Lt. Collins' party. The Indians, coming from
every side, were exposed to their own fire and so forbore the use of bow or
firearm and relied mainly upon spears, tomahawks and sabers. After the first
discharge of carbines, which was with deadly effect, the soldiers relied wholly
upon their revolvers, as there was neither time nor opportunity for reloading.
The party had faced towards the station when the impossibility of proceeding
further became apparent. The Indians, anxious for their prey, and confident in
overwhelming numbers, rushed towards the common center in such a manner as to
partially impede their bloody purposes. So intermingled did the combatants
become that it was impossible for the garrison to distinguish friend from foe,
and Major Anderson dared not open with the howitzer upon the heterogeneous mass
that surged towards the station. But he sent all available force across the
bridge to aid his struggling comrades. This diversion served to enable Lt.
Collins' party to cut their way through and rejoin their comrades. Just as they
were emerging from the crowd of their enemies, Lt. Collins' horse became
unmanageable, carried his rider far into the mass of surrounding Indians, and
nothing but his body, horribly mutilated, was ever afterwards seen. The loss in
Lt. Collins' party was but 5 killed and one severely wounded. The escape of the
remainder was miraculous. Not a man expected to get out alive and their comrades
at the station gave up all hope of saving them.
As soon as this affair was over, the Indians turned their whole
attention to Sergeant Custard's party. When the Sergeant first saw the Indians,
he was near the river, and at first felt confident that he could make the
station in spite of them. To this end he put out flankers from his small party,
but these were speedily driven in, and when the Indians appeared in such large
numbers as to render further progress impossible the Sergeant directed the
corralling of the wagons in a position for defense. At this time the Indians
made a rush from all sides upon the party, cutting off four men from the
advance, and preventing the Sergeant from getting his wagons into position for
defense. The men who were cut off rode into the Platte river with the purpose of
crossing, which three of them accomplished, and reached the station in safety
during the following night. The other was killed when about half way across the
stream. Prevented by the sudden and overwhelming attack of the Indians from
getting the wagons into a position for defense, Custard's men sheltered
themselves behind their horses (which were soon shot down), and the
irregularities of the ground, which favored them. By their great courage and
presence of mind the Indians were prevented from the anticipated effect of their
sudden charge, and were held in check and compelled to resort to other means of
approach. The men were well armed and supplied with an abundance of cartridges,
all in the company to which they belonged having been given to them on starting
their journey, and were veterans who had faced death on too many battlefields to
be frightened at it in whatever terrible guise it might come. The fight that
commenced at ten o'clock in the morning ended at four. For six hours, 20 men had
held at bay one hundred times their number of desperate savages, who paid the
penalty of their victory with a heavy loss. The men must have fought with
wonderful skill as well as resolution. The Indians carried logs and rocks to the
vicinity and rolled them forward, thus making a moveable breastwork, from behind
which they plied their deadly weapons. Not a man in Custard's party was left to
tell the tale and not one of their bodies were even recognized, the Indians
having knocked them to pieces and carried away many of the fragments. The
fighting could be seen from the station but only its outlines could be
determined. Details were gathered from the three men who escaped, from the
evidences left on the ground, and from the Indians themselves, who told the
squaw of a Frenchman named Redhan, whom they captured a few days after at Rock
Creek, 20 miles below Fort Halleck, of their numbers, the time of the fight, of
the terrible resistance, and their large excess of losses over that of the
whites. The Indians also threw away the scalps taken in the fight, which were
afterwards picked up on the ground of the battle. This is said to be evidence
that they lost more lives than they had taken.
During the night of the 22nd, Maj. Anderson succeeded in hiring
two half-breed scouts at the station to take a message to Captain Allen at Deer
Creek, thirty miles below. They reached Deer Creek in safety next morning, and
Capt. Allen at once put his company in motion for Platte Bridge, but on his
arrival, about noon, not an Indian was to be seen. The mutilated bodies and
fragments of bodies were gathered together and buried with military honors in
one grave.
A few days afterwards all the companies of the 11th on the
telegraph line were relieved by detachments of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, and
proceeded to Fort Leavenworth for muster out.
ELISHA MUSTERS
OUT
The Biography of Elisha L. Spalding: Excerpt from Pioneers of
the Bluestem Prairie, Pottawatomie County, Kansas
Elisha Lowtrip Spalding was born 11 Nov. 1824 in Indiana and died at Lucas
(Kansas) where he is buried. He was the son of Ephraim and Sarah Lowtrip
Spalding and Grandson of Miner and Sarah Mot Spalding. He married (1) Illinois
1847 Lucinda Brown, (2) 1858 Margaret Young, (3) Margaret Wilson. Lucinda Brown
was born in Illinois in 1828 and died 16 Aug. 1857 in Illinois, where she is
buried.
Elilhsa Lowtrip Spalding's ancestor was Edward Spalding who came to
Jamestown, Virginia with Sir George Yeardley in 1619 from England. Elisha was
born in Indiana and then his father and family moved to Knox County, Illinois.
There Ephraim los his life by fire and Elisha's mother married Wilson Brown. In
1847 Elisha married Lucinda Brown, his stepsister by this marriage. Elisha was a
(cooper?) [sic] but had been an engineer, lawyer and farmer. In the 1850's he
made a trip by oxen team to California. He served in the Civil War in Co. K 11th
Kansas Cavalry from September 1862 to September 1865 and sustained serious
injuries resulting in a pension. Elisha moved to Pottawatomie County in 1860 and
lived north of St. George. In 1876 he moved to a farm near Lucas.
His children: Julia Ann b. 19 Dec. 1848 Illinois, d. 29 April 1920 Manhattan
Kansas, m. 3 Oct. 1867 James Franklin O'Daniel, son of James and Margaret
(Howell) O'Daniel; Mary b. Illinois m. Aust Van Norwick; Luther Greathouse b.
Illinois m. Ida Lumbeck; Lydia b. 26 June 1859, m. Frank Axtell; Rose b. 16 May
1861, m. Lucas, Kansas, Cyrus L. Manley; Fred b. 10 Feb. 1867; m. 1885 Lucas,
Kansas, Mary Frances Horner; Wilson; Sarah b. 1872 d. 1914 Russell, Kansas, m.
1895 J.C. Ruppenthal, Jr.
Click
Here for Elijah Nelson Doughty's Civil War Diary of Travels of
the 11th Regiment Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, D Company. Of
special interest, Elijah Doughty is also related to us through the marriage of
his daughter to Newton Gumm. Ironically,
Elisha Spalding's brother Daniel married Diadema Gumm, Newton's aunt!
For more family information on our relationship to Elijah Doughty, click here. For more information concerning
our Gumm family ancestry, click here.
